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Abstract: Do incumbents in an election have an advantage, and if so, are these advantages het-
erogeneous across parties or government and opposition? We ﬁrst present a theoretical discussion
on the possible heterogeneity of incumbency eﬀects in a pure two-party system. Then, we estimate
the incumbency eﬀect for the direct district candidates in German federal and state elections using
a regression discontinuity design (RDD). When studying the heterogeneity in these eﬀects, we ﬁnd
that incumbents from both large parties, the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD, have an
advantage only if the SPD is in government. This eﬀect is robust and shows even in state elections
that are unrelated to federal elections - calling into question the ﬁndings of average incumbency
eﬀects in the literature. Because this eﬀect is stronger in the East than in the West and only
shows post reuniﬁcation, we hypothesise that the emergence of the socialist party “The Left” may
be behind this heterogeneity.
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21 Introduction
The electoral advantage of incumbency is perhaps one of the best known and
least understood facts of American political life.
Since Abramowitz (1975, p. 668) made this statement, much work has been dedicated to
changing this fact. However, there are still new and interesting questions to be investigated:
for instance whether there are heterogeneous incumbency eﬀects regarding the party identity
or across government and opposition. In this paper, we use data from German federal and
state elections to assess this potential heterogeneity in the incumbency eﬀects of district
representatives.
We start with some theoretical observations on incumbency eﬀects across parties and gov-
ernment participation in a pure two-party system. The essence is that an interaction term
for an incumbent that also belongs to the governing party cannot logically capture a full
government participation eﬀect on the incumbency advantage. It can only show the hetero-
geneity in this eﬀect across parties. The reason is that one interaction eﬀect is the mirror
image of the other. If the incumbents of both parties have the same positive eﬀect of being
in government, the interaction term will be zero. This also complicates the interpretation
of our estimation results because we cannot know which party was driving the eﬀects.
We estimate the incumbency eﬀects for direct candidates of German federal elections be-
tween 1976 and 2009 and state elections between 1993 and 2010 using a regression discon-
tinuity design (RDD). We make use of the fact that direct district candidates are elected
by a ﬁrst-past-the-post system and estimate the eﬀect from observations when a candidate
just lost or just won an election. This makes the variation in incumbency status arguably
as good as random.
We indeed ﬁnd incumbency eﬀects, but also important heterogeneity between the two main
parties, the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU)1 and the center-left Social Democrats
(SPD)2: both parties only beneﬁt from an incumbency eﬀect when the SPD is in government.
We explore whether the eﬀect might be driven purely by the SPD because of the increased
competition from the left side of the political spectrum. We ﬁnd three facts in favor of this
hypothesis: (1) the eﬀect exists only after reuniﬁcation, (2) the eﬀect is stronger in the
East than in the West of Germany and (3) the vote share of “The Left”3 party is directly
aﬀected.
1Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and its Bavarian Branch Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) are
referred to as Christian Democrats or CDU for simplicity.
2Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschalnds (SPD)
3Die Linke (in English: The Left) was previously called Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS).
’The Left’ is used for simplicity.
3Our estimation of heterogeneous eﬀects shows that average incumbency eﬀects may not
be the whole story. In fact, the average of the eﬀect can be misleading and is largely
uninformative about potential mechanisms. The observation that a positive incumbency
eﬀect for both parties only exists when the SPD in government suggests that many of
the usually stories told to explain the eﬀect may not matter at all. Due to the observed
heterogeneity, it is unlikely that the eﬀect in Germany is driven by name recognition,
media coverage, general pork barrel spending in the districts or helping the constituents in
handling bureaucracy.4 Instead, we believe that our ﬁndings lend support to the hypothesis
that political competition is one of the main drivers of incumbency eﬀects (Snyder and
Hirano (2009)).
Our paper is linked to three incumbency-related strands of literature: to the empirical
estimation of incumbency eﬀects in general; to the observation in the literature that incum-
bency eﬀects seem to be increasing over recent decades; and to papers that try to investigate
the heterogeneity of incumbency eﬀects.
A large strand of literature in political science investigates the issue of incumbency empiri-
cally.5 Lee (2008) uses an RDD to estimate the causal eﬀect of incumbency on subsequent
election outcomes. Using data from the US House of Representatives, he ﬁnds a sizable
incumbency eﬀect of a 45 percentage points higher probability of winning the next election.
Following the RDD analysis of Lee (2008), Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) study the eﬀects
of incumbency for US mayors. They ﬁnd an eﬀect of incumbency on the probability of
winning of about 32 percentage points.
Empirical studies that use close elections as a source of exogenous variation are not without
controversy. Caughey and Sekhon (2011) and Grimmer, Hersh, Feinstein, and Carpenter
(2011) show that those candidates in the US House that barely lost and those that barely
won are by no means identical on average – an important indication that the design in Lee
(2008) might not mimic the empirical gold standard, a randomized experiment. Snyder,
Folke, and Hirano (2011) argue in response to the critique that it is true that at the threshold
there should be no diﬀerence between winners and losers. However, as a practical matter,
being near the threshold means that there may be diﬀerences simply because cutting a
strictly unimodal distribution implies that there will be more probability mass on one side
than on the other even when you are reasonably close to the threshold.
4See for instance Krehbiel and Wright (1983), Cox and Katz (2002), Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart
(2000a), Levitt and Wolfram (1997), Cover (1977), Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder (2006), Cox and
Katz (1996), Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1984) and Bickers and Stein (1996)
5See for instance Mayhew (1974), Jacobson (1987), Gelman and King (1990), King and Gelman (1991),
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000b) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004).
4There is some empirical literature on incumbency eﬀects also for Germany. Hainmueller and
Kern (2005, 2008) use an RDD and federal election data to show an average incumbency
eﬀect of 1-2 percentage points (in vote share). Our work is closely related to theirs. For
local mayors in Germany, Freier (2011) estimates an eﬀect of 38-40 percentage points in
the probability of winning. Meanwhile, there is no known empirical investigation of the
incumbency eﬀect in German state elections.
The second question in the literature, which our contribution is connected to, is why the
incumbency advantage seems to be increasing over recent decades.6 In an early paper on
the issue, Mayhew (1974, p. 313) hypothesizes:
Voters dissatisﬁed with party cues could be reaching for any other cues that are
available in deciding how to vote. The incumbency cue is readily at hand.
However, Ansolabehere, Hirano, Snyder, and Ueda (2001) and Krehbiel and Wright (1983)
reject the hypothesis that persons have replaced parties in this respect. Our results also
indicate that the incumbency advantage has increased in Germany since reuniﬁcation in
1991. Since party loyality were less strong in the East, this may be one aspect, but we leave
this investigation to future research.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature that tries to identify heterogeneity in in-
cumbency eﬀects. For example, Snyder and Hirano (2009) investigate the heterogeneity of
incumbency advantages regarding competitiveness and budget size and ﬁnd sizeable diﬀer-
ences. To the best of our knowledge, the heterogeneity that we investigate – government
participation – is not studied in any existing rigorous empirical research design.
One ﬁnal introductory point: some studies use the vote share, some the probability of
winning as an outcome variable and naturally are they closely related. Since probability of
winning works better when parties decide not to (re-)run, it has become the more standard
outcome variable. However, we show that during large political swings the probability of
winning may end up at its boundaries zero and one, which hides any potential incumbency
eﬀect.7 Again, by disregarding this important feature in the probability of winning, average
incumbency eﬀects in this measure are potentially very misleading. For that reason, we
prefer the vote share as our measure of outcome.8
6See Cox and Katz (2002) for an example and Jacobson (1987) for a discussion of what ”increase”
actually means and, more importantly, does not mean.
7This issue is related to but diﬀerent from the one identiﬁed in Jacobson (1987). Our concern is that
the choice of variables may hide an empirical result.
8Note that in Germany the two large parties, CDU and SPD run in every single election that we observe.
Thus, we do not have to be concerned about strategic entry or exit into the district races.
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the logical ne-
cessities in estimating heterogeneous incumbency eﬀects in a pure two-party system, and
the institutional background for German elections. In section 3 we present our empirical
strategy, section 4 shortly introduces the data we use and section 5 presents and discusses
the results, the interpretation and some validity and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes
the analysis.
2 Theoretical and Institutional Background
2.1 Theoretical considerations
We begin with some logical observations on incumbency eﬀects and the potential to identify
heterogeneity by government participation. To ﬁx ideas, we assume a two-party system and
introduce the following notation. There are two parties j = C;S, and the outcome variable






















where gj is the dummy for government participation of party j and dj is a dummy equal
to one if the incumbent is from party j. At ﬁrst glance, one could imagine bringing one
of the two equations to the data (using diﬀerent districts and diﬀerent time periods) and
estimate the parameters j. Would, e.g., C give us an indication on the heterogeneity in
the incumbency advantage when party C is in government? The answer is no. The analysis
is complicated by the interaction of parties.
To clearify this, note that, in a two party system, there are three equalities that we know
hold:
g
C = 1   g
S
d
C = 1   d
S (3)
Y
C = 1   Y
S
6If we insert the above equalities into the equation 1 and rearrange, the relationship between
the parameters for the two parties is as follows:
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There are two key observations to extract. First, and most importantly, the relationship
between parameters on the interaction term is ﬁxed to C =  S. Somewhat surprisingly,
this implies that the parameters C;S cannot capture an eﬀect that incumbents from either
party can receive (we cannot have j > 0 for both parties). Thus, an empirical speciﬁcation
that uses models like the ones presented here will not identify a universal government bonus
for incumbents.
The intuition for this eﬀect is as follows. Say, both parties are equally able to push their
district incumbents only when they are in government. Say further, party C is in govern-
ment and can make it such that the party receives an additional 5% in votes in the next
election in all districts with party C incumbents (because resources by the government were
channelled to the district or the incumbents could receive more media attention). Via this
mechanism we now observe an incumbency advantage for party C incumbents.
Now assume that party S is in government and can engage in the same behaviour. Districts
in which party S is incumbent now receive an additional 5%. This is the same as saying
that party S will do worse (relatively) in districts with party C incumbents. Crucially this
implies that we would observe that party C incumbents also have an incumbency advantage.
Despite the fact that the mechanism is driven by the access to government of the incumbents
of party S, we observe that incumbents from both parties have an incumbency advantage.
If both have the same government bonus, S = C will be zero. If a universal government
bonus exists and contributes to the incumbency advantage it will be indistinguishable from
other mechanisms.
Say, we ﬁnd S and C to be signiﬁciant (j 6= 0). This neccessarily implies that there is
heterogeneity in how both parties can capitalize on a government bonus. It is only if, e.g.,
one party can use the government bonus and the other cannot, that we can empirically
observe S and C to matter. Note, that similar to above, we can still not say, which of the
two parties is actually driving the results.
The second key observation is that the parameters j and j interact in S = C + C.
Assume that C is positive and C is negative and both have the same size in absolute
values. That implies that S is zero and S is positive. What at ﬁrst looks as if party C is
7punished when in government (while party S gains) can also be interpreted as showing that
both have an incumbency eﬀect when party S is in government: C for party C and S plus
S for party S. This is the way we interpret our results below. Stated diﬀerently, when we
hold the governing party constant, the incumbency eﬀects of one party is the mirror image
of the eﬀect for the other. For more clarity, we supply a graphical interpretation of these
considerations in the appendix.
Turning from the simple example to the actual data, we should note that the German
system includes more than two parties. However, there are two major parties (CDU and
SPD) that participate in every district during federal elections. Almost all directly elected
candidates come from one of the two major parties. Hence, we expect the results to be a
noisy representations of the above logical observations.9
2.2 Electoral system
The German electoral system at the federal and state level is a mixed-member proportional
system. The intention of such a system is to have proportional representation in parliament
without sacriﬁcing local representation and accountability of the legislators. Therefore,
voters make two distinct choices on election day. First, they cast their ballot for the
representative of their district (hereafter direct candidate) in a ﬁrst-past-the-post system.
Second, they elect the party for the proportional representation in parliament (hereafter
second ballot).
There are twice as many seats in the federal parliament (Bundestag) as there are electoral
districts. The second ballot determines the number of seats that a party can ﬁll in total,
and it is calculated with the Sainte-Laguë algorithm.10 Direct candidates always get their
seat; the remaining seats are ﬁlled through the party lists. If there are no remaining seats,
that can happen if, a party has more winning direct candidates than there are seats for
it, the party will get one more seat in the federal parliament, a so called overhang seat
(Überhangmandat).11
9Cox and Katz (2002) analyze the incumbency advantages for Republicans and Democrats separately
and ﬁnd interpretable diﬀerences. However, in a pure two-party system one should be the mirror image of
the other. Their results and interpretation is therefore at odds with our theoretical considerations.
10This algorithm divides the total number of votes by the total number of seats. The resulting quotient
is the “price” for each seat. In a next step, the number of votes that each party receives (their “budget”)
is divided by this quotient or “price” to get the exact number of seat that this party should receive with
perfect proportionality. Using standard rounding, these exact numbers are then turned into integers.
11The exact calculation in the federal election is complex, as the algoritm applies separately to each
state. The resulting overhang seats in the federal election are not compensated for, which implies that
proportionality can be violated. In 2009, the federal election resulted in 24 overhang seats (out of a total
of 622 seats), all for the CDU (or CSU in Bavaria), whereas in 2005 there were 7 for the CDU and 9 for the
83 Empirical Strategy
The empirical challenge for estimating incumbency eﬀects is that incumbency is not exoge-
nous: comparing the vote share of those districts with CDU incumbents to those with SPD
incumbents will tell us nothing causal about the eﬀect of incumbency. We therefore rely on
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to isolate exogenous variation in the incumbency
status.12 The model that we use for our estimation is
yi;t+1 =  + t + di;t + di;tgt + h(vi;t;di;t;gt;) + s + i;t (5)
We run a separate regression for both parties, CDU and SPD, but leave out the superscript
p for better readability. For the same reason, we also leave out the superscript s denoting
the state that a district belongs to. The outcome variable yi;t+1 is the vote share of that
party’s direct candidate in the next election t+1 in district i. In later speciﬁcations we also
use the probability of winning or the vote share of the second ballot in the next election as
an outcome variable.
The coeﬃcients of interest are  and , where di;t is the incumbency or treatment dummy
and gt denotes whether the party in question was in government or not. The t replaces
the stand-alone gt term as these election ﬁxed eﬀects t are collinear with the government
dummy.
The function h() is the control function of the margin of victory, vi;t; that is, the diﬀerence
in vote share between the candidate in question and the best opponent. This margin of
victory can be positive or negative, depending on whether the candidate of that party won
or lost. A margin of victory close to zero implies a very close race and the relationship
between di;t and vi;t is as follows:
di;t = 1[vi;t > 0] (6)
The function h() is fully interacted with the incumbency and government dummies. While
interacting the control function with the treatment dummy (di;t) is common practice, the
interaction with the government dummy gt serves an important purpose, too. We allow the
eﬀect of the vote share in t to have a diﬀerent impact on the vote share in t+1 depending
SPD. In state elections, these overhang seats are usually compensated for by giving other parties additional
seats, too. The details regarding these so called leveling seats (Ausgleichsmandat) vary.
12Others use a similar design using close elections in order to estimate causal eﬀects of political outcomes.
Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) are among the ﬁrst, Hainmueller and Kern
(2008), Ade and Freier (2011), Freier (2011), Freier and Odendahl (2011) are examples in the context of
Germany. See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a more general treatment of RDDs.
9on whether the party in question is in government or not. This mimics the approach of
estimtating the incumbency eﬀect in separate samples for being in government or not.
Finally, we include state ﬁxed eﬀects s.13
After this short description of our empirical approach, we discuss the RDD approach and its
assumptions before turning to the issue of whether we can causally interpret the interaction
term. In general, RDDs have a forcing variable v that may or may not be correlated with
unobserved variables that aﬀect the outcome y. In our case, the margin of victory is the
forcing variable v and is correlated with a general preference for one or the other party.
Our outcome is vote shares in the next election, which is clearly related to both preferences
and the margin of victory. However, there is a discontinuous jump in the party identity of
the winner. So even though v is related to y, it is so continuously, which implies that the
jump in our treatment variable is exogenous.
Our design is therefore based on the assumption that the expectations of the potential
outcomes y0 and y1 in a Rubin Causal Model are continuous in the forcing variable v.14
That is, the vote share of the CDU in the next election should be continuously related to
the current margin of victory v of the CDU candidate in both worlds: whether the CDU
candidate wins or loses.
For example, one concern is that parties could be able to sort around either side of the
threshold v = 0. That is, if there is some unobservable factor that makes CDU candidates
the winner in some close races but not others, the design would be invalid because potential
outcomes would not be continuous in v.
It is impossible to test this key assumption directly since we cannot observe the outcomes
in both worlds, when the CDU candidate wins and loses. However, we can oﬀer auxiliary
methods to assess whether it is plausibly satisﬁed.
Another concern is that parties strategically place candidates in contested districts. There
are two arguments in favor of our approach. First, both parties would strategically place
candidates. Second, the direct candidates are usually of a local breed, which limits the
scope for the party to strategically place a speciﬁc candidates. What is more, this would
not necessarily invalidate our design: if it is still random whether they lose or win if the
race is close, our results remain internally valid. External validity is a diﬀerent matter, but
the two arguments in favor of our approach mitigate a potential problem here.
13There are 16 states, including three city-states, in Germany, with a total of between 250 and 325
districts. For example, the city-state of Berlin has 12 districts.
14See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for details.
10The inclusion of a control function is essential, unless we are very close to the threshold.
A correctly speciﬁed control function will capture any correlation of di;t with the error
term that might be of concern. In our estimations we use a sample limited to observations
within a 2% margin of victory without a control function, the 5% margin sample with a
linear control function, and the whole sample with a 4th order polynominal control function.
The eﬀect that we are estimating is of course local in nature: we are only using close
election outcomes for identiﬁcation. However, because of the ﬁrst-past-the-post system the
vote share of winners ranges from around 30% to 47% because the smaller parties typically
nominate a direct candidate as well.
It is important to note that we are estimating the incumbency of parties and not of speciﬁc
candidates. While it might at ﬁrst appear to be more intuitive to study the incumbency
eﬀects of speciﬁc candidates that run for consecutive elections, such an analysis requires
signiﬁcantly more data and econometric modeling.15 The major issue complicating the
analysis is the endogenous choice of the candidates to exit the race. A candidate that
considers it unlikely to win next time will choose to opt out, while a sure winner may be
more likely to stay in the race. This would bias our results because we can only look at
those that stayed in the race. Incumbency (or (re-)running) would then be related to the
expected vote in future elections.16
By focusing on party incumbency we eliminate this problem. Our incumbency measure, also
used by Lee (2008) and Hainmueller and Kern (2008), includes the personal incumbency
eﬀect without bias as well as potential spillovers to a new candidate from the same party.
We now turn to the causal interpretation of the interaction term. Our RDD setting allows
us to estimate a causal eﬀect of incumbency in each of the four possible samples separately:
CDU plus CDU in government, CDU plus SPD in government, SPD plus CDU in govern-
ment and SPD plus SPD in government. Under the assumptions discussed above, each of
these eﬀects compares bare CDU winners to bare CDU losers (and likewise for the SPD).
When we interpret the interaction eﬀect causally, we in eﬀect compare the eﬀects in these
four diﬀerent samples.
This comparison is problematic insofar as there may be other aspects aﬀecting the in-
cumbency eﬀect and that are correlated with the party in government. When we oﬀer
interpretations for heterogeneous incumbency eﬀects, we always do so with the caveat in
15See Gelman and King (1990) for a full discussion of the personal incumbency advantage.
16Cox and Katz (2002) discuss this issue in detail, while Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) show that it is
less of a problem in US elections.
11mind that government participation may not be the whole story. However, one of our ro-
bustness test – estimating the same interaction eﬀect in 13 election periods between 1994
and 2010 from eight diﬀerent German state elections – shows that the eﬀect is similar. This
increases our conﬁdence that government participation may be the decisive factor in the
comparison. We return to this issue in section 5.3.
4 Data
We use oﬃcial election data for federal and state elections. In table 1 we summarize the
data for the federal elections. Starting with the election in 1976, there are nine government
terms, with the last election in 2009. Since the last government term saw a so called
“grand coalition” of the center-right CDU and the center left SPD, we only include the last
period in robustness tests. Three terms ended before the oﬃcial four years were over: in
1983 a government change led to new elections, in 1990 the reuniﬁcation required a shorter
duration and in 2005 chancellor Schröder called for a federal election after his unpopular
Agenda 2010 reforms led to landslide victories for the opposition in several state elections.
One concern with the data is redistricting of the electoral districts, in particular before the
2002 election.17 We exclude observations of districts that had seen substantial changes in
the structure of the voting population. The number of observations reported in table 1 may
therefore deviate from the absolute number of districts. Column 3 of table 1 contains the
leading party in the government coalition.18 Columns 4 and 5 show the number of direct
seats that both parties have won. The ﬁnal two columns show, for the CDU only, how
many of the races were close: 199 using a 2% margin and 514 using a 5% margin. Since the
leading candidates in almost all districts are from CDU or SPD, this also gives an indication
of how many were close for the SPD. Only in recent years has the SPD seen a few more
tight races in districts where they had competition from third parties.
During our robustness tests , we also estimate incumbency eﬀects and government partic-
ipation at the state level. The descriptive statistics for these are given in table 4 in the
appendix.
17For the 2002 election, the number of districts was reduced to 299 from 328. We analyzed this reform
and found that 238 districts remained structurally unchanged. To make sure that the inclusion of these
observations does not drive our results, we exclude this year from robustness tests but results remain
unchanged.
18The ﬁrst and the last government term is special in this respect. In the 1980-83 period, the government
changed after three years from a SPD-FDP coalition to a CDU-FDP coalition. The latter coalition, however,
only governed for four months before an early election took place, so we coded the period as ”SPD”. In the
2005-09 period, Germany had a so called ”grand coalition” that consists of the two large parties CDU and
SPD. This period is coded as both CDU and SPD.
12Table 1: Descriptives - federal elections
Period Obs. Head of Seats won Tight elections (CDU)
Government CDU SPD 2% margin 5% margin
’76-’80 161 SPD 98 63 18 41
’80-’83 248 SPDa 121 127 20 49
’83-’87 248 CDU 180 68 22 57
’87-’90 248 CDU 169 79 21 51
’90-’94 322 CDU 232 89 24 60
’94-’98 325 CDU 221 100 25 71
’98-’02 238 SPD 97 140 20 60
’02-’05 296 SPD 125 168 22 61
’05-’09 279 CDUb 138 137 27 64
2365 1381 971 199 514
aAfter the ﬁrst two years of the four year term the coalition partner of the SPD, the
FDP, decided to cooperate with the CDU and elected a CDU chancellor. In order to
morally legitimize the new government called for early election in 1983. Overall the the
CDU led government was in power for only four months before the premature election.
Hence the SPD headed the government for most of the period and we coded the period
as SPD governed.
b Coalition government of CDU and SPD, led by the CDU. Notes: Source: Own
calculations based on the data provided by the state oﬃces for statistical services.
5 Results
5.1 Main results
The results of our main estimation are presented in table 2. The upper panel shows the
results for the estimation using only the center-right party (CDU), the lower panel the
results using the center-left party (SPD). We estimate three diﬀerent speciﬁcations that we
repeat for each of the diﬀerent cases. The ﬁrst only uses data from observations within a 2
percentage points margin around the threshold, the second speciﬁcation uses data with a
ﬁve percentage point margin and also includes a linear control function, and the last uses
the full sample while making use of a fourth order control function. Without a government
interaction term, the eﬀects for both CDU and SPD should have the same size and sign
in a pure two-party system, as outlined in section 2. The ﬁrst three columns of table 2
show that this holds true even in the German system that is not a pure two-party system.
The ﬁrst line shows the estimates for the CDU in all periods that we consider, that is,
1976-2009. They compare well to the ﬁrst line in the lower panel for the SPD. The bottom
estimates of both panels show the average incumbency eﬀect for the period 1990-2005. Our
estimates are in the same ballpark as those of Hainmueller and Kern (2005).
Turning to the heterogeneity in the eﬀects in columns 4-6, we ﬁnd that the CDU and the
SPD have a positive incumbency eﬀect in periods when the SPD was in government: in
13column 4, the CDU candidate gains 2.9% points in the subsequent election after when a
CDU candidate barely won the past direct candidate election, but is not in government,
whereas the SPD gains 3.5% points (treatment estimate plus interaction term). These
eﬀects compare well to alternative speciﬁcations in columns 5 and 6. When the CDU is in
government, the eﬀects for both parties are insigniﬁcant.
The lower part of both panels show the same eﬀects for the later period 1990-2005, that is,
after reuniﬁcation. The eﬀects are noticeably larger, albeit not signiﬁcantly so. Comparing
the eﬀects also to the subperiod from 1976-1990, we ﬁnd that the overall eﬀect is entirely
driven by the later subperiod. In fact, for the early period, even the average incumbency
eﬀect cannot be consistently found.19 We return to those before and after reuniﬁcation
diﬀerences in the discussion of the results in section 5.2.
We can also inspect these eﬀects graphically. Figure 5.1 shows the incumbency eﬀect from
the perspective of the CDU. When the CDU is not in government, there is a sizable jump
of roughly 3 percentage points in the vote share during the next election. This compares
well to the stylized ﬁgure 4 in the appendix. Figure 5.1 contains the same eﬀect when the
CDU is in government. As the estimation results suggest, there is no incumbency eﬀect.
So far, we consider the vote share as our outcome variable. How these gains in vote share
translate into a probability of winning is what we turn to next. Table 3 is structured in
the same way as table 2. In columns 1-3, we see an average incumbency eﬀect of roughly
22 percentage points in the probability of winning, which again is in the same ballpark as
those in Hainmueller and Kern (2005). Columns 4-6 show that the incumbency eﬀect on
the probability of winning is only present if the SPD is in government: 43.8% points for
the CDU candidate, and 34.7% points for the SPD candidate. All eﬀects are stable across
diﬀerent speciﬁcations.20
However, there is a problem with using the probability of winning as an outcome variable:
it is bounded at zero and one. While this is theoretically true for the vote share as well, it
is not of practical importance there. For the probability of winning on other hand, this can
pose a serious problem for the estimation. Figure 5.1 displays the incumbency eﬀect on the
probability of winning for a speciﬁc election pair graphically. The left hand side shows the
probability of winning in 2009 for SPD incumbents from 2005. The probability of winning
would yield an incumbency eﬀect of zero, so what happened?
19That is not to say that an average incumbency eﬀect does not exist. However, it is noticable that we
cannot pick it up in the data consistently before but can after reuniﬁcation.
20For the period before 1990, the average incumbency eﬀect using the probability of winning as an
outcome is roughly the same (not shown). However, the interaction term is insigniﬁcant.
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Notes: This ﬁgure presents the jump in the vote shares at the zero margin of victory threshold. The data
is grouped in bins of 1% in the margin of victory. The line is based on a local kernel estimation using
Epanechnikov weights. Source: Own calculations.
The explanation is that there was a large shift in the political landscape in 2009 (the
outcome variable for these graphs is from 2009), when the SPD lost many seats to the
CDU. At the margin, that means that nobody in the SPD that won with up to a 2% points
margin in 2005 reclaimed their seats. The mirror image of this is that everyone from the
CDU with up to -2% points margin of victory in the 2005 election, won a seat. The essence
of this is that large political swings can bring the probability of winning to its lower and
upper bounds.
This can potentially be problematic for any study that uses the probability of winning as
the outcome variable. If the probability of winning is at its boundaries at times of large
political swings and not at others, the interpretation of an average incumbency eﬀect in
this measure is misspeciﬁed. As pointed out in ﬁgure 5.1, there can be times in which an
incumbency advantage may exist (in vote share, see right panel), however, the probability
of winning cannot pick it up. This is why the vote share is our preferred outcome measure.
5.2 Discussion
The theoretical observations in section 2 above show that the interaction term can only
capture heterogeneity, not a full government eﬀect on incumbency. Moreover, we saw that
































−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
Margin of victory
Notes: This ﬁgure presents the (lack of a) jump in the vote shares at the zero margin of victory threshold.
The data is grouped in bins of 1% in the margin of victory. The line is based on a local kernel estimation
using Epanechnikov weights. Source: Own calculations.
both parties have an incumbency eﬀect when the SPD is in government, but none when the
CDU is in government. Whether the CDU or the SPD is driving the former eﬀect – one
must be roughly the mirror image of the other – and what might be the underlying reason
for the heterogeneity, is the question we explore next.
Our hypothesis is that the social democrats (SPD) are driving the eﬀect and that the in-
creased competition by a far-left party that emerged after reuniﬁcation is the reason behind
the heterogeneity. After the fall of the wall in 1989, the SPD soon faced a serious competi-
tor from the left, the post-communist party The Left (Die Linke/PDS). We believe that in
this setting SPD-district representatives are only successfully in district races against CDU
and The Left if they hold the incumbent position and have the backing of the government.
It is only then that these representatives may successfully promote the district’s interests in
actual decision making while they were weak and easy to attack in all three other cases.21
There are three key arguments supporting our hypothesis. First, the heterogeneous incum-
21The literature also suggests that political competition may well be the reason for an incumbency
advantage. Snyder and Hirano (2009) ﬁnd that the incumbency eﬀect is larger in competitive districts.
Stein and Bickers (1997) suggest that incumbents in competitive districts may use the resources of oﬃce to
a larger extent, which is in part conﬁrmed in other contexts, for instance for competitively elected judges
in Gordon and Huber (2007).
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Notes: The left part displays the probability of winning by margin of victory for SPD incumbents in 2005,
using the 2009 election results as outcome variables, the right hand part the vote share. Source: Own
calculations.
bency eﬀect is really only observable after reuniﬁcation (as argued before), second, it is
stronger in East Germany and third, we can show that district incumbency for the SPD
has a direct negative eﬀect on the votes share of The Left.
Regarding the ﬁrst argument, we have already highlighted the diﬀerential eﬀects for the
period before and after 1990 in tables 2 and 3.
The second argument that the eﬀects are stronger in the east is shown by table 5 in the
appendix. The eﬀects in the East are between 2 and 5 times as high, albeit not as robust
across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, while the eﬀects in the West are still signiﬁcant and reason-
ably robust. What is special about Eastern Germany is the vote share of the socialist party
The Left. Figure A.2 in the appendix shows that the median in the East was between 10%
and 30%, while in the Western districts it was below 5% until 2009 when they reached
around 7%.
The third point, that an SPD incumbent had a negative impact on the vote share of The
Left, is presented in table 6 in the appendix. We read this table from the perspective of
an SPD incumbent: treatment d is deﬁned as winning a seat for the center-left SPD, and
the government dummy g indicates whether the SPD was in government. The outcome,
17however, is the direct candidate and second ballot vote share of The Left, not of the SPD.
The results show that the SPD incumbency eﬀects when the SPD is in government might
have been partly at the expense of the left party, even though the eﬀect is not stable across
all speciﬁcations.
Summing up, there is considerable evidence for our hypothesis that the SPD, under increas-
ing competition, may have scaled up its eﬀorts in districts with winning SPD candidates.
Thus, increased competition from the far left may drive the heterogenous incumbency ef-
fect: Not only are the eﬀects bigger in the East, where The Left has its strongholds, and
higher after 1990, but also there is a negative eﬀect of SPD incumbents on The Left vote-
share. A further indication that these observations are not casual is that we ﬁnd the same
heterogenous eﬀects for state elections (see table 8 in the appendix).
Although we believe that there is support for our hypothesis we emphasize that all those
arguments can only give an indication. The RDD analysis in subgroups (east-west, before
and after 1990) does not explain what determines the diﬀerences between these groups but
only shows that they exist. In principle, one could argue that other than the above presented
mechanism could cause the diﬀerent results for the subsamples. To rule out some alternative
explanations, we investigated whether candidate characteristics diﬀer by whether SPD or
CDU is in government. For that, we coded the biographies of all close winners in our
sample.22 We ask whether either one of the following four alternative hypotheses could
play a role in the observed diﬀerences: 1.) Increase in the share of women in parliament,
2.) changes on ties of candidates to their local constituency, 3.) diﬀerences of qualiﬁcation
level of the candidates and 4.) tenure in the parliament and party. The results are presented
in table 9 in the appendix.
First, we look at the share of women by party and governmental lead. Voters might be biased
towards women as politicians, and women could receive less of an incumbency advantage as
a result. Also, there have been changes in the structure of female participation in parliament
during the period of observation. However, while it is true that the SPD has a higher share
of women among the winners of close races, there is no diﬀerence between times in which
the CDU or SPD had the governmental lead. We conclude that the observed heterogeneity
in the incumbency eﬀects cannot be explained by the number of female candidates in the
22We took the biographical information from the periodical publication “Kürschner’s Jahrbuch” in which
all members of parliament of a given period are brieﬂy introduced. We did this for every district that was
decided within a margin of victory of 2 percentage points, which we believe is a close margin. Unfortunately,
we only observe these characteristics for the winner of close races, and we cannot consistently compare these
characteristics also for the losers. This implies, that we cannot directly introduce those variables in the
RDD analysis.
18races.23
Moreover, we coded whether a candidate was born in the district as a proxy for the local
ties of a candidate. Although the diﬀerence in shares is not negligble (particularly for the
SPD), those diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant.
We also investigate two measures of candidate quality, the share of university graduates
and the share of candidates that hold important positions in the party or the government.24
There is no indication that candidates of SPD and CDU were diﬀerent depending on who
was in charge of the government.
Lastly, we coded the seniority of the candidates both within the parliament and in the
party. We have information on how many periods and years a candidate has served in the
parliament (at the time of winning the close race) and about the years of membership with
the party. Also, here we do not observe any diﬀerences.
We also repeated this analysis for the later period (1990-2005) only for which we ﬁnd strong
heterogeneity eﬀects (not reported). Also in this period, we do not observe signiﬁcant
diﬀerences of candidate characteristics by governmental lead.25
Overall, the analysis of the candidate characteristics does not hint at an alternative expla-
nation as to why we observe the heterogeneous incumbency eﬀects. While this does not
directly imply that our preferred hypothesis is indeed correct, it makes it more likely that
this is the case.
Moving from the speciﬁcs of our interpretation to broader political economics questions,
our results show that positive and signiﬁcant estimates of an incumbency eﬀect may not
show what they seem to show. In our case, the average incumbency eﬀect for both parties
may lead readers to believe that both have an incumbency eﬀect. Yet the eﬀect diﬀers
by party and government participation as we have seen. The theoretical explanations as
to why these eﬀects exist (e.g. media coverage, name recognition) may therefore be very
diﬀerent once we consider heterogeneity.
23Note, that the share of women indeed increased sharply after 1990 in the SPD. However, within the
subperiod from 1990-2005 there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the number of women among close winners
by governmental lead.
24We coded a candidate to be in an important position if she was holding a position in the cabinet, as
a undersecretary in a ministry, was active in the board of the party, heading a parliamenary committee or
was the spokesperson of the party.
25Among all the characteristics we observe one signiﬁcant diﬀerence (only at 10 percent level). Results
are available from the authors upon request.
195.3 Robustness and Validity
In this ﬁnal subsection, we oﬀer some robustness and validity checks for our main results. A
ﬁrst robustness check is whether these results hold for state elections as well – a government
level in Germany not been covered so far by other empirical studies on the subject. State
elections work in a similar way as federal election with the added complication that if
there are overhang seats, the other parties are compensated in some way such that the
proportionality is roughly preserved. This in turn implies that direct candidates change the
ﬁnal result of the election to a lesser extent. Moreover, the direct candidates – especially
in the Eastern states – do come from parties other than CDU and SPD, moving us further
away from a pure two party system.
Table 8 in the appendix provide the results for the state elections that conﬁrm our analysis
on the federal level. For the center-right party (CDU), the eﬀects are very robust and
slightly larger than the federal eﬀects.26 For the center-left party (SPD), the eﬀects are
not as stable, which indicates that on the state level the party system is more diverse
even for the direct candidates. However, they still indicate that being in government is –
in relative terms – beneﬁcial for SPD incumbents: when the SPD is not in government,
the incumbency eﬀect is an insigniﬁcant -4.5% points in column (6); when the SPD is in
government, the eﬀect is 3.9% and insigniﬁcant as well. However, the diﬀerence between
the two is signiﬁcant.
The results for the second ballot of the election, can also serve as a further robustness
test. In table 7 in the appendix, we ﬁnd that a spillover eﬀect of incumbency (incumbency
externality eﬀect) towards the second ballot exists and go in the same direction as our
main results. The eﬀects for the CDU are very robust: the average incumbency eﬀect
is slightly positive and signiﬁcant but when disaggregated by government participation,
the incumbency eﬀect is only positive when the opposition is in government. For the
SPD, the eﬀects are less strong and robust, but have the same sign as those for the direct
candidates.27 The fact that the SPD results are less clear in the second vote is somewhat
puzzling. Unfortunately, we did not ﬁnd a fully consistent story in the data, that could
help us to understand this observation.
In two further robustness checks, we exclude the 1998-2002 period and include the 2005-
2009 period respectively. There are two concerns with the 1998 election and the vote share
26Note that the state elections come from the post-reuniﬁcation period only. Therefore, the correct
comparison is the lower panel of the federal table.
27For the second ballot, Germany clearly has a multi-party system, which brings us even further away
from the two-party considerations above.
20outcomes in 2002. First of all, 1998 was a major swing in the political landscape, away
from the CDU towards the SPD and the Greens. Second, there was a major redistricting
in 2002. While we drop observations that were diﬃcult to match to older districts, there
could still be a selection eﬀect. In the 2005-2009 period, the governing (“grand”) coalition
consisted of the two major parties, CDU and SPD. When we drop the election in 1998
(that is, we drop those that run as incumbents in 2002), the results are unchanged and, if
anything, stronger (table not included). When we include the 2005 election (and therefore,
the 2009 outcomes), the results remain unchanged (not shown).28
Turning to the validity of our original design, we conduct a placebo test in which we set
the threshold of the margin of victory to -5% and +5% respectively. In other words, if
we set the threshold to -5%, we are comparing losers to losers, and if we set it to +5%
we are comparing winners to winners. The results for the period 1990-2005 using only the
center-right party (CDU) are given in table 10 in the appendix. There are no stable eﬀects
of incumbency, especially for the speciﬁcation using the interaction term.29
Further validation of our design comes from a histogram that shows the frequency of margins
of victory. While not suﬃcient, such a frequency comparison gives an indication of whether
close election occur with equal frequency on both sides of the threshold – an important
aspect of whether the variation around the threshold is as good as random. The top
panels of ﬁgure 7 show the distribution of margins of victory for the full sample (left) and
zooming in on the range between +/-10% (right). The lower panels show the frequencies
by government participation in the subsequent period, zooming in on the sample +/-20%.
In all four panels there are no noticable diﬀerences in the distribution to either side of the
threshold.
A ﬁnal test for the validity of the RDD is to check whether observations on either side
of the threshold are balance in observable characteristics. Caughey and Sekhon (2011)
suggest that the two variables are of speciﬁc interest: the predetermined vote share in the
previous election and the past incumbency status. Figure 8 illustrates that we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the distributions of these variables. The upper two graphs show
the binned averages in the mean, while the lower graphs focus on the second moment of
the distribution. Overall, the tests of frequencies, placebo treatment, and predetermined
variables indicate that our research design is valid.
28When we include the 2005-2009 period, we code the government interaction as SPD in government and
CDU in government. Results are available from the authors upon request.
29The results are similar to those using the SPD, or using +/-2% and +/-10% as placebo thresholds (not
shown).
216 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the heterogeneity of incumbency eﬀects for direct candidates
in German federal elections. We ﬁnd the same average eﬀect for both parties that is
previously identiﬁed in the literature. However, when we disaggregate the eﬀects into
government participation and opposition, we ﬁnd noticeable diﬀerences between the two
major parties: both parties have an incumbency eﬀect only when the center-left party SPD
is in government. This eﬀect holds up in a wide range of speciﬁcations and even in state
elections that are unrelated to federal elections.
As we show theoretically, it is impossible to identify an overall government participation
eﬀect because in a two party system, one incumbency eﬀect is the mirror image of the
other: if candidates of the governing party have an incumbency advantage, the opposition
candidates have a likewise advantage because losers of one party reﬂect winners of the other.
What we therefore identify is a heterogeneity in the government participation eﬀect.
We also explore what might explain the heterogeneity in the incumbency eﬀect. Based on
additional evidence we argue that the increased pressure of the former communist party
“The Left” on the center-left SPD after reuniﬁcation may have induced the SPD to use its
direct candidates more to its advantage when in government.
Beyond the main ﬁndings of the paper the results also expose a weakness in the current
literature: average incumbency eﬀects may not tell you much regarding the theoretical
eﬀects behind them. The observation we make that a positive eﬀect for both parties is only
present if the SPD is in government challenges the customary view that name recognition,
presence in the media and pork-barrel spending matter for the incumbency advantage.
Investigating the heterogeneity of these eﬀects is therefore a promising avenue for future
research.
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25A Appendix
A.1 Graphical representation of the theoretical consideration
A graphical representation of thetheoretical observation in section 2.1 may be helpful for
an intuitive understanding. Let us assume that the incumbent can generate beneﬁts for her
district if, and only if, her party is in government. We further maintain the assumption of
a pure two-party system. What we expect to see is the following (ﬁgure 4): if party C is in
government, those candidates of party C that barely win (area II) compared to those that
barely lost (area I) will experience an incumbency advantage at the next election because
their party is in government. The winners in area II are driving the results so to speak.
Figure 4: Incumbency eﬀect – from party C’s standpoint
Somewhat surprisingly, we can use the same ﬁgure for party C candidates if party C is not
in government. The losers in area I are now driving the results because their opponents
are from party S and are barely winners. Since party S is in government, they receive an
incumbency advantage in the next election compared to candidates of party S that barely
lost. The opponents of those that barely lost are from party C and therefore we see an
incumbency eﬀect for those party C winners even though the winners from party S were,
in fact, driving the results. The ﬁgure therefore shows that when both parties’ incumbents
beneﬁt from being in government, the interaction term above will be zero.
26How would heterogeneity show in this ﬁgure? Assume once more that C is positive and
C is negative and both have the same size in absolute values. If party S is in government,
ﬁgure 4 still shows the eﬀect of party C, captured by C. Figure 5 then shows the eﬀect
when party C is in government, captured by C plus the negative C. In this ﬁgure, the
party C winners in area II are the party S losers when party C is in government. Party
S incumbent winners in area I therefore experience no incumbency eﬀect, captured by S.
Going back to ﬁgure 4, however, we notice that party S winners do have a large incumbency
eﬀect when they are in government, as the party C losers in area I are the winners of party
S, captured by S plus S.
Figure 5: Incumbency eﬀect – again from party C’s standpoint
A.2 Tables and Figures
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28Table 2: Federal elections - party incumbency and government participation
Incumbency Gov. Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Center-right party / CDU
All elections 1976-2009
Treatment (d) 0.017*** 0.010* 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.017* 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Interaction (g*d) -0.019** -0.011 -0.013
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Period from 1976-1990
Treatment (d) 0.015*** 0.005 0.010* 0.014* -0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Interaction (g*d) 0.002 0.011 0.006
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Period from 1990-2005
Treatment (d) 0.020*** 0.015* 0.020*** 0.041*** 0.032** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Interaction (g*d) -0.036** -0.030* -0.030**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
Panel 2: Center-left party / SPD
All elections 1976-2009
Treatment (d) 0.023*** 0.013** 0.011** 0.010 0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Interaction (g*d) 0.025*** 0.024** 0.017*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Period from 1976-1990
Treatment (d) 0.022*** 0.011 0.007 0.016* 0.012 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Interaction (g*d) 0.014 -0.001 -0.003
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Period from 1990-2005
Treatment (d) 0.024*** 0.015* 0.012* 0.009 -0.007 -0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Interaction (g*d) 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
N (Panel 1/ Panel 2) 199/201 514/524 2365 199/201 514/524 2365
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Year and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent
variable is the vote share of the respective party in t. The regressions in columns 1-3 indicate the pure party incumbency eﬀect.
Columns 4-6 also include the interaction between treatment (winning the district in t   1) and whether the party is in charge of
government activity. Estimates in panel 1 are for the center-right party (CDU) and panel 2 show the results for the center-left party
(SPD). Sample restrictions and control functions of the margin of victory are indicated below. Any polynomial control function of
the degree indicated is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
29Table 3: Federal elections - Probability of winning
Incumbency Gov. Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Center-right party
Period 1976-1990
Treatment (d) 0.262** 0.233* 0.316*** 0.235* 0.173 0.292***
(0.103) (0.125) (0.118) (0.118) (0.116) (0.105)
Interaction (g*d) 0.039 0.076 -0.074
(0.198) (0.217) (0.184)
Period 1990-2005
Treatment (d) 0.241** 0.226** 0.161* 0.438*** 0.382** 0.312***
(0.095) (0.098) (0.083) (0.164) (0.159) (0.120)
Interaction (g*d) -0.342* -0.277 -0.316**
(0.190) (0.195) (0.157)
Panel 2: Center-left party
Period 1976-1990
Treatment (d) 0.262** 0.233* 0.316*** 0.274* 0.249 0.218
(0.103) (0.125) (0.118) (0.146) (0.176) (0.148)
Interaction (g*d) -0.039 -0.076 0.074
(0.198) (0.217) (0.184)
Period 1990-2005
Treatment (d) 0.235** 0.215** 0.193** 0.091 0.064 0.012
(0.092) (0.098) (0.083) (0.100) (0.112) (0.100)
Interaction (g*d) 0.347* 0.347* 0.333**
(0.188) (0.194) (0.156)
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Year and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent
variable is the probability for the party of winning the district in t. The estimates are for the sub period 1990-2005. The regressions
in columns 1-3 indicate the pure party incumbency eﬀect. Columns 4-6 also include the interaction between treatment (winning the
district in t 1) and whether the party is in charge of government activity. Estimates in panel 1 are for the center-right conservative
party and panel 2 show the results for the center-left social democrats. Sample restrictions and control functions of the margin of
victory are indicated below. Any polynomial control function of the degree indicated is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of the
threshold. Source: Own calculations.
30Table 4: Descriptives – state elections
State Term Obs. Head of Seats won Tight elections (CDU)
Government CDU SPD 2% margin 5% margin
Bav ’03-’08 91 CDU 91 0 0 1
Brand ’99-’04 44 SPD 2 37 4 10
Brand ’04-’09 44 SPD 4 17 4 8
Hesse ’03-’08 51 CDU 49 2 2 8
NRW ’05-’10 127 CDU 89 38 7 24
LS ’98-’03 100 SPD 16 84 7 17
LS ’03-’08 45 CDU 43 2 2 5
RP ’01-’06 51 SPD 21 30 6 20
SAAN ’94-’98 34 CDU 25 8 7 17
SAAN ’98-’02 34 SPD 2 32 2 4
SAAN ’02-’06 22 CDU 21 1 0 1
Thur ’99-’04 44 CDU 44 0 0 0
Thur ’04-’09 44 CDU 39 0 4 6
731 446 251 45 121
Notes: Abbreviations: Bav - Bavaria, Brand - Brandenburg, NRW - North Rhine-Westphalia, LS
- Lower Saxony, RP - Rhineland-Palatinate, SAAN- Saxony-Anhalt, Thur- Thuringia
Source: Own calculations based on the data provided by the state oﬃces for statistical services.
31Table 5: Eﬀects by region: incumbency in the former East and West
Former East Former West
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Center-right party
Treatment (d) 0.128*** 0.040 0.064* 0.036** 0.029* 0.035***
(0.008) (0.032) (0.034) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
Interaction (g*d) -0.137*** -0.037 -0.074 -0.028* -0.030* -0.032**
(0.009) (0.034) (0.046) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
N 12 32 216 76 213 927
Panel 2: Center-left party
Treatment (d) -0.002 -0.027 -0.038 0.016** 0.005 -0.003
(0.042) (0.031) (0.038) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Interaction (g*d) 0.105 0.158** 0.094* 0.023** 0.018 0.029**
(0.074) (0.060) (0.049) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
N 13 34 216 76 213 927
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Year and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent
variable is the vote share of the respective party in t. The estimates are for the subperiod 1990-2005. Panel 1 refers to results of
the center-right conservative party. Panel 2 presents estimates for the center-left. Columns 1-3 are for the subsample of election
districts in the former East while columns 4-6 refer to the former West. Sample restrictions and control functions of the margin of
victory are indicated below. Any polynomial control function of the degree indicated is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of the
threshold. Source: Own calculations.
32Table 6: Eﬀect on the left party
Vote outcome of the left party
Majoritarian vote Proportional vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of winning
Treatment (d) 0.000 0.017 0.005 0.002 0.014 0.005
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
Interaction (g*d) 0.000 -0.030* -0.019 0.001 -0.024** -0.018*
(0.005) (0.016) (0.014) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011)
N 92 260 1181 92 260 1181
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Year and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable
is the vote share of the left party in t in the SPD design (margin of victory of the social democrats). The regressions in columns 1-3
indicate the eﬀect on the majoritarian vote in diﬀerent speciﬁcation while columns 4-6 show the eﬀects on the proportional vote.
Treatment d indicates that a SPD candidate won the district. The interaction (g  d) means that the SPD incumbent has access
to the government. Sample restictions and control functions of the margin of victory are indicated below. Any polynomial control
function of the degree indicated is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
33Table 7: Federal elections – party incumbency and government participation in the proportional
vote
Incumbency Gov. Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Center-right party
Treatment (d) 0.018** 0.010 0.018** 0.039** 0.028 0.034***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012)
Interaction (g*d) -0.037** -0.032* -0.028**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.014)
N 91 252 1181 91 252 1181
Panel 2: Center-left party
Treatment (d) 0.016** 0.012* 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Interaction (g*d) 0.016 0.018 0.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
N 92 260 1181 92 260 1181
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Year and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent
variable is the vote share of the respective party in the proportional vote (Zweitstimme) in t. The estimates are for the sub period
1990-2005. The regressions in columns 1-3 indicate the pure party incumbency eﬀect. Columns 4-6 also include the interaction
between treatment (winning the district in t   1) and whether the party is in charge of government activity. Estimates in panel 1
are for the center-right conservative party and panel 2 show the results for the center-left social democrats. Sample restrictions and
control functions of the margin of victory are indicated below. Any polynomial control function of the degree indicated is speciﬁed
to be ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
34Table 8: State elections – party incumbency and government participation
Incumbency Gov. Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Center-right party
Treatment (d) 0.026** 0.036* 0.025** 0.052*** 0.041** 0.057***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
Interaction (g*d) -0.053** -0.065** -0.065**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.025)
N 45 121 731 45 121 731
Panel 2: Center-left party
Treatment (d) 0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.023 -0.051 -0.045
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) (0.036) (0.037)
Interaction (g*d) 0.047 0.072* 0.084**
(0.031) (0.039) (0.040)
N 51 129 731 51 129 731
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ’Margin’ in this table means the diﬀerence in percentage points between the winner and the next best opponent.
For example, in the case of only two candidates a margin of 5 percent means that the winner may have gotten at most
52.5 percent while the other got 47.5 percent. Source: Own calculations based on the data provided by the state oﬃces for
statistical services.
35Table 9: Winners of close races by governmental lead
Lead CDU Lead SPD Diﬀerence
SPD CDU SPD CDU SPD CDU
1. Gender
Share of women 0.26 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.03 -0.02
(0.76) (0.74)
2. Local Ties
Share born in district 0.58 0.48 0.41 0.61 0.17 -0.13
(0.11) (0.23)
3. Qualiﬁcation
Share with university degree 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.04 -0.07
(0.69) (0.49)
Share with important positions 0.30 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.04
(0.94) (0.69)
4. Seniority
# of periods in parliament 2.58 3.30 2.61 2.69 -0.03 0.61
(0.93) (0.14)
# of years in parliament 5.74 8.36 6.36 6.53 -.62 1.83
(0.64) (0.24)
# of years in the party 21.30 24.57 23.22 23.96 -1.92 0.61
(0.34) (0.81)
# of Obs 43 50 44 36
Notes: The data covers the full sample from 1976 to 2009. Standard errors for the diﬀerence are
reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
36Table 10: Placebo tests - majoritarian vote of center-right party in federal elections
Dep. Variable: vote share in majoritarian vote for center-right party
Incumbency Gov. Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Minus 5 percent
Treatment (d) 0.008 0.000 -0.002 0.013 0.009 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Interaction (g*d) -0.008 -0.015 -0.004
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
N 112 256 1181 112 256 1181
Panel 2: Plus 5 percent
Treatment (d) 0.002 -0.011* -0.012* 0.004 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Interaction (g*d) -0.004 -0.001 -0.003
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
N 98 237 1181 98 237 1181
Controlfunction No linear 4th order No linear 4th order
Sample 2% margin 5% margin full 2% margin 5% margin full
Year and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable
is the vote share of the respective party in t. Panel 1 refers to results of the placebo test in which we simulate that a party obtained
the district incumbency status also if it lost the district race with at most 5 percentage points. Panel 2 presents estimates for the
reverse placebo test in which a party needed more than 5 percentage points winning margin to gain the incumbency status. The
regressions in columns 1-3 indicate the pure party incumbency eﬀect. Columns 4-6 also include the interaction between treatment
(winning the district in t   1) and whether the party is in charge of government activity. Sample restrictions and control functions
of the margin of victory are indicated below. Any polynomial control function of the degree indicated is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on
both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
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Notes: The ﬁgures show the relationship between the margin of victory for the CDU in t-1 and two
predetermined variables: vote share and incumbency status both in t-2. For clarity the data have been
grouped in bins, each bin representing an interval of 0.5 percent in the margin of victory. We display only
the observations within a margin of victory of 0.2 to draw the focus on the decisive threshold. The upper
two graphs show the ﬁrst moments, while second moments of the variables are displayed in the lower graphs.
The lines ﬁtted onto the data is based on a local kernel regression using endogenous Epanechnikov weights.
We also estimate the eﬀects on the predetermined variables in regressions similar to the ones presented in
table 2 and we found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the predetermined variables. Source: Own calculations.
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